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The philosopher must twist and turn about so as to pass by the mathematical 
problems, and not run up against one,—which would have to be solved before he 
could go further. . . . 
Even 500 years ago a philosophy of mathematics was possible, a philosophy of 
what mathematics was then. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1956, IV, § 52) 
 
1. Opening 
 The task of this essay is to put biological individuals in formal terms. This approach is 
not directly interested in matters of time (for example, in evolution), but rather in the formal 
shape of biological objects.
1
 So it is radically different from natural science. In his later years, 
Wittgenstein made similar investigations in psychology and mathematics.
2
 Unfortunately, he 
found no time to make extensive remarks on philosophy of biology. This is what we are 
going to advance here. 
 The approach followed in this essay opposes, above all, the intensionalism in the 
philosophy of biology. A typical case of biologically motivated intensionalism is the 
theory of “organic wholes” adopted, among others, by one of the founding fathers of 
analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore. The most radical form of intensionalism, however, is 
vitalism. Vitalism, which is as old as biology is, contends that compared to the elements of 
matter, biological individuals contain elements which are of a fundamentally different 
kind. This conception was already embraced by Aristotle who introduced the concept of 
“final cause” which is to be kept apart from the material cause. 
 The most radical form of vitalism was developed in German Philosophy, first, in the 
eighteenth century by Leibniz and his followers. In the nineteenth century, Nietzsche 
                     
1
 An ontological (structuralist) concept of the biological kinds, which doesn’t necessarily oppose Darwin’s 
theory of evolution, was suggested by D. W. Thompson (1917); see also Rescher (2011). On the compatibil-
ity of the formal biology with the mainstream theory of evolution see § 22. 
2
 See the motto for this essay. 
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maintained that life is much stronger than knowledge (1874, § 44). At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Hans Driesch still explained the life of biological individuals with the help 
of the Aristotelian term of entelechy. This is a substantial entity, controlling all biological 
processes (Driesch 1905). 
 Our objective in this essay will be to tentatively estimate the possibilities of applying 
formal approach in biology, not to develop an explicit and strict formal biology. To this 
purpose, we shall briefly discuss three different approaches in formal biology. 
 
2.  Wittgenstein’s Formal Biology 
2.1. Wittgenstein’s Material a priori  
 As cases of formal biology can be cited some ideas or, more precisely, hints of Bertrand 
Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. In “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” (1918) Russell 
compared philosophical logic to zoology. According to him, logic investigates the “ ‘zoo’ 
containing all the different forms that facts may have” (1956, p. 216). Our claim is that this 
conception of Russell has also its flip side: Zoology can be seen as logic. The task of the logic 
of zoology—and of biology in general—is to describe zoological/biological individuals in 
formal terms—in terms of their forms. 
 The conception of logical forms as biological individuals was implicitly developed, but 
in a rudimentary form, by Russell’s pupil Wittgenstein. In Remarks on the Foundations of 
Mathematics the latter raised the question: 
 
But could one not study transformations of (e.g.) the forms of animals? But how 
‘study’? I mean: might it not be useful to pass transformations of animal shapes in 
review? And yet this would not be a branch of zoology. 
 It would then be a mathematical proposition (e.g.), that this shape is derived from 
this one by way of this transformation. (The shapes and transformations being 
recognizable.) (1956, III, § 13) 
 
According to this idea, geometrical figures, numbers, but also biological individuals, can be 
seen as shapes (forms) which can be studied by respective formal disciplines that describe 
their transformations. Importantly enough, Wittgenstein now is reluctant to call these formal 
3 
disciplines logic because is indignant at the all-embracing claims of this discipline. He made 
these claims when he wrote the Tractatus. 
 Formal biology, in particular, describes qualitative forms (Gestalten) of biological 
objects. Hence it is a type of morphology. Not a morphology of Goethe’s type, however. 
Wittgenstein’s philosophical morphology tries to find the forms of the individuals with the 
only aim to analyze and discuss them. In contrast, Goethe’s morphology is not analytical (not 
formal) but complementary. It is a kind of natural science—a suggested alternative to the 
science of Isaac Newton.  
 Here is a brief description of Wittgenstein’s approach:  
 
Wittgenstein sees the task of elucidating here, above all, as to put of the data together 
[zusammenstellen]; the data are to be so put together that to suggests an understanding. 
... In this way he suggests a ‘general picture’ of the data, which presents them 
perspicuously, without to pay attention to their temporal order. (Schulte 1990, p. 32) 
 
Now, it is exactly this seeking of new formal orders of biological individuals, that suggests 
new patterns of individuals that are the proper subject of this type of formal biology. 
 This approach is based on the understanding that biological individuals are mosaics of 
forms, so that at every instance—in every biological individual—we see the object in only 
one of its many forms; its other forms remain implicit.
3
 The task of formal biology is to find 
out these forms. Its method is the comparison of the different forms of biological individuals 
(including that of “folk biology”) that it collects in formal patterns of most variegated order. 
In contrast, mainstream biology is only interested in the spatial–temporal (in the real) orders 
of biological individuals. 
 Wittgenstein’s formal biology is clearly a rich research program. It contrasts, the 
conventional taxonomies in biology, introduced into it by Carl von Linnaeus, are linear and 
so monotone. Also today, the mainstream taxonomies in biology are usually built on an 
inclusive relation of genus to an art. Their ideal is the arbor Porphyriana by which every new 
classification relates a genus to an art. Wittgenstein was sharply critical to it. In 
“Conversations with M. O’Drury”, he noted: “I have always thought that Darwin was wrong: 
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 This conception is based on an idiosyncratic interpretation of the Wittgenstein’s Tractarian objects, devel-
oped in Milkov (2001). 
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his theory doesn’t account for all this variety of species. It hasn’t the necessary multiplicity. 
(1981, p. 174) 
 
 Wittgenstein’s description of biological individuals compares forms (shapes) of objects 
in order to pick out new patterns in which new forms of theirs are presented. An instructive 
example of this method is provided by Wittgenstein in Remarks on the Philosophy of 
Psychology: 
 
But might it not be that plants had been described in full detail, and then for the first 
time someone realized the analogies in their structure, analogies which had never been 
seen before? And so, that he establishes a new order among the descriptions. He says, 
e.g. ‘compare this part, not with this one, but rather with that’ ... and in so doing he is 
not necessarily speaking of derivation [Abstammung]. (1980, § 950) 
 
 Despite the fact that Wittgenstein did not elucidate what this new discipline exactly is, he 
gave hints at how to develop parts of it when he introduced the concept of forms of life 
(Lebensformen). He uses this expression in an idiosyncratic way at that. For Wittgenstein, this 
term is a biological, not a social category. Thus he held that there is a man’s form of life, 
lion’s form of life, etc. In fact, every biological species has its own form of life. In contrast, in 
ordinary German, this concept means social, or spiritual ways of life, not biological forms of 
life. One maintains, for example, that different social classes in the nineteenth-century 
Germany had different Lebensformen (ways of life). This was the sense of the concept 
Lebensformen also according to the man who first introduced it in the theoretical 
humanities—Eduart Spranger (1914).  
 Comparing different forms of life is only one type of the patterns in formal biology. As 
already noticed, however, biological individuals have data of different order. So we can 
investigate different orders of biological forms (shapes): 
 (i) The outer form of the animals. “Are tomatoes fruits of vegetables?” “Is a zebra 
without strips a zebra?”—all Wittgenstein’s questions! 
 (ii) Animals’ behavior (habitus) understood as a form;  
 (iii) The animals’ psychology: what animals strive for, hope for, dream for, etc.  
 Etc. 
5 
These different kinds of investigations give rise of different kinds of formal biology. At the 
end we have descriptions of different patterns of biological forms which can be ordered in 
separate chapters.  
 Importantly enough, these investigations are similar to that Wittgenstein made of colors 
in Remarks of Colour. Historically, it followed the approach of “pattern analysis,” introduced 
in humanities by Oswald Spengler who compared the archetypes of different cultures (Haller 
1988, pp. 74–89). These are analyses of data, of indefinables, of objects (faces, shapes) that 
cannot be analyzed further.
4
 In Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein analyzed this way 
the forms of: the fly (§§ 284, 309), goose (p. 221), hare (§§ 520, 521, 524, 542), dog ( §§ 250, 
357, 650, pp. 174, 229), beetle (§ 293), cat (§ 647), cow (§§ 120, 449, p. 220), lion (p. 223), 
mouse (§ 52), parrot (§ 344, 346), cat (§ 647). “They constitute an autonomous, natural order 
that is not capable of being invented or constructed through acts of man.” (Smith 1992) In 
this sense, they are cases of material a priori. 
 
2.2. Formal Ontology of Biological Objects 
 Formal ontology of biological individuals was also advanced by Nicolai Hartmann who 
held that the world is a united system, which nevertheless has many strata. The strata are 
ordered one onto another, so that each one “is not isolated in itself, but rather sets out the 
conditions and regularities for the next strata” (1940, p. 182). Every stratum of a higher order 
is a superstructure on the grounding stratum. Perhaps we can better understand this 
ontological dependence in the light of John Searle’s conception that strata are not causally but 
ontologically dependent. The strata of higher order are only a trait of the strata of lower order 
(1983, pp. 20–1). 
 This position was also embraced by Karl Marx according to whom the subject is 
parasitic upon the world: it does not have anything else to do than to imitate reality.
5,6
 The 
subject makes this in an attempt to “grasp” the world, to assimilate it, becoming in this way 
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 See Milkov (1999). 
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 The alternative positions, which accept that the subject can achieve something of his own, are necessarily 
circular. Take, for example, the conception that the subject’s aim is to be “capable of making molecules swerve 
from their paths” (Searle 1984, p. 92). It again assumes an action upon the world and not independent of it. 
6
 A similar position was maintained by Wittgenstein. We are going to discuss it in § 3.1. 
6 
identical with it.
7
 As Marx put it—following Aristotle, via Hegel,—the subject makes this in 
an act of “appropriating of alienated, objectivated essence” (1974, p. 242). 
 As for their uniformity, in our formal ontology we hold that biological individuals are 
different developments of one and the same form of nature (see Thompson 1907). We follow 
in this a long tradition in searching for a uniform ontology in biology and philosophy of 
mind. Two examples: (i) Nietzsche claimed that thinking has its primitive stages in the pre-
organic world. “ ‘Thinking’ in primitive states (pre-organic) is forming on—so as it is by the 
crystals.” (1901, § 499) (ii) The same did Bertrand Russell who claimed that “lifeless 
instruments, such as photographic plates and gramophones … have something closely 
analogous to perception” (1927, p. 270). 
 The acceptance of the uniformity of the nature of biological individuals paves the way 
for elaborating a powerful formal ontology in biology. We, more precisely, can see different 
ontological individuals as constructed out of simple forms, through their modifications and 
different arrangements. 
 According to this conception, different kinds of organic individuals, plants, animals, 
homini sapienti and their thinking, are results of different ways of composing complexes 
which can be described by logical means. In order to demonstrate this, we will refer to our 
investigations in Wittgenstein’s Tractarian ontology.8 According to them: 
 (i) The objects are arranged in complexes, fitting one to another in certain way. 
 (ii) By picturing, the forms of facts are delivered (expressed) by other facts (pictures)—
in a certain way (style). Importantly enough, the form of projecting hinges on the form of 
facts. 
 (iii) The copying (deliverance) of facts by thinking is the way of projecting the facts 
through language. 
 (iv) Creating (gestures, postures, etc.) is also an act of delivering of forms in a certain 
way. This time, however, the act of projecting (expressing) changes the form completely so 
that a new form is created. 
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 In this sense, Konrad Lorenz states that biological individuals make pictures (Abbildungen) of the real world, 
which are similar to a plaster copy of a coin (1973, p. 39). 
8
 As developed in Milkov (1997, i, pp. 372–4; 2003: ch 3, § 3, (vi); and in the chapter “Wittgenstein’s Ways” 
in this volume. 
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 Our final thesis is that not only the different strata of the world, but also the strata of 
biological objects, can be logically constructed and also explained in this way. Accordingly, 
our formal ontology of biological individuals describes the different ways in which biological 
individuals are composed. 
 Our hope is that the formal ontology of biological objects we are suggesting in reference 
to Wittgenstein puts many points of both contemporary biology and contemporary 
philosophy in a new light. Take as an example biological evolution. Our formal ontology 
describes it as accomplished in accordance with the laws of composition of complexes. This 
conception is supported by the mainstream evolutionary biology today, which maintains that 
the change in the life-world is a result of gene mutations. In fact, the genes can be seen as 
nothing but forms (from a logical point of view, they can be seen as the identification 
numbers of the biological objects) that are quasi “attached” to some of their building-blocks-
chromosomes. On this view, the natural selection consists in that only those individuals 
survive that have more developed forms. Importantly enough, the “development” here is 
understood in terms of information.
9
 In other words, these types of individuals survive that 
have better information-gain (Lorenz 1973, p. 38).
10
  
 This conception of the species-evolution maintains that there is no place for teleology in 
it but for abundance of forms and their subsequent combination. In this variety, the winner is 
contingent. So Daniel Dennett: “Replication is not necessarily for the good of anything. 
Replicators flourish that are good at ... replicating.” (1990, p. 129) The selection among the 
forms takes place in a process of ceaseless experiments, through a constant confrontation with 
the forms of reality. The method is that of experimenting and correcting. The neo-Darwinian 
Richard Dawkins sets out as necessary conditions for the biological evolution via natural 
selection three factors:  
 (i) Abundance of most variegated elements;  
 (ii) The elements must be able to copy themselves;  
 (iii) Interaction between the form of the elements and the form of environments 
(Dawkins 1976, p. 127). 
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 Karl Popper’s “evolutionary epistemology” (1984) maintains virtually the same. 
10
 Here it is to remember that the etymology of the concept of information is connected with the concept of form. 
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3. Mereology of Biological Individuals   
3.1. Wittgenstein’s Biological Mereology 
 Mereology is a well-established approach in philosophy of biology, already use by 
Aristotle in De partibus animalium and also by the Stoics. In modern times, Joachim Jungius, 
Gottfried Leibniz and Bernard Bolzano made important contributions to mereology. But 
mereology was also widely explored in early analytic philosophy, for example in 
Wittgenstein’s conceptual analyses as developed in the last pages of the Notebooks 1914–
1916.  
 According to Wittgenstein,
11
 the subject and the world are separated one from another; 
they are independent one from another and are self-contained. In another sense, however, the 
subject is compelled to imitate the world in attempts to grasp it—to become identical with it. 
The aim is to quasi abolish the difference between the person and the world. This relation is 
made either in the form of contemplation, or in a form of creation.  
 The very impulse to know the world comes out of the consciousness that we are unique 
subjects. “Only from the consciousness of the uniqueness of my life arise religion–science–
art.” (Wittgenstein 1979, p. 79) At that, the person and the world lie in two different planes. It 
is true that the impulse to know the world comes from the person. However, he doesn’t exist 
in the plane of this knowledge: we cannot find it amongst the pictures made by him. “The 
subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.” (1922, 5.632) This 
explains why “solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure 
realism” (5.64). 
 All this means that there is in the world a thinking subject and also another willing 
subject, which are situated in two different planes. This means that they cannot be seen 
together in one and the same time. The volitional subject exists only as the cause of our 
knowledge. Unfortunately, very often it is extrapolated onto the world of ideas, thus 
producing confusions with important consequences. This mistake is easy to commit since the 
volitional subject is embedded in a body, which is a part of the material world.  
 
3.2. Hegel’s Mereology of Biological Individuals 
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 In the next paragraphs we follow Milkov 1997 i. pp. 381 ff.; see also Milkov (2004). 
9 
 In Philosophy of Nature (Volume 3 of his Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences), 
Section Three (“Organics”), Hegel has made a bunch of interesting suggestions in the “logic” 
of biology. Hegel’s “science of logic”, however, like all classical logic before Frege, was 
built “within the bounds of a mereological idea of logic” (Stekeler-Weithofer 1992: 100). 
That is why his logic of biology is more of a mereology of biological objects. 
Unfortunately, so far this part of Hegel’s philosophy remained in the shadow. 
 Hegel’s biological mereology makes analyses similar to these of Wittgenstein as 
discussed above: it describes biological individuals in terms of wholes, their parts and their 
location. In what follows, we are going to set it out—indeed, only in rudimentary form,—but 
recovered from Hegel’s speculations. 
(a) Biological Individuals. To Hegel, only animals and humans are biological 
individuals. This is already shown in the fact that the flowers in our private garden have no 
proper names, whereas our pets have names. In order to mark off this difference, we can call, 
for convenience, the plants particulars and the animals individuals. 
 The fact that animals are individuals while plants are only particulars, explains why the 
former have, while the latter haven’t: 
 Self-expression: Animals express themselves through their voices; in persons this 
characteristic is further developed in language. 
 Locomotion: Animals are not connected with one point in space as plants are 
connected; but they are nevertheless connected with some spatial point which they 
chose and which they occupy now. 
 Senses: Animals have feelings: pain, joy, etc.; plants don’t have feelings. 12 
 Souls: animals have souls, plants have not. 
 How are all these—and other—characteristics to be formally interpreted? Following 
Hegel, in the next sections we are going to give a tentative answer to this question. 
 (a) Shape (Gestalt). An organism has characteristically a form (Gestalt), which it 
reproduces in its biological successors. But while the plant “is still closely related to 
geometrical forms and crystalline regularity” (§ 345),13 the form of the animal is something 
radically new. It is a biological form. 
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 Pace Gustav Theodor Fechner, who believed that plants have souls (1848). 
13
 Here and in what follows the quotations are from Hegel (1970). 
10 
 Another formal difference between plant and animal is that whereas plants mature 
through a change of form, animal’s maturation involves a change in size, the animal’s shape 
remains the same (§ 343). This point is another argument to hold that the plant is not an 
individual but a particular: it ceaselessly changes its outer individuality (see (e), below). 
(b) Mereology of Biological Individuals. Organic individuals can be also seen as 
conventional unities that contain parts—the members (limbs) of the individuals. The 
difference between them can be well described as a difference in the set-up of unities:  
 The members of plants are not related one to another. 
 In animals, the members are related; they are elements of their unity—elements of their 
form. The members of animals are interchangeably means and ends (§ 355); indeed, 
they are perpetually negating their independence (§ 350). 
 What is new with the human person is that he concentrates his power into a single point 
of his body, deploying it into certain direction, and for particular purposes. 
(c) Sense. Most important characteristic of animals is their sentience: they have feelings. 
In fact, feeling is nothing but a form of connection of the biological individual with the world 
made from the perspective of its self-preservation (§ 344, Add.). This connection is realized 
through the stimuli produced by the individual that recurrently encounters matter. In other 
words, perception is stimulation by matter, and a reaction of self-preservation in the face of 
that stimulation (§ 354). 
 Senses are spatio–temporally determined. In sight, the physical reality manifests itself 
spatially; in listening, it does so temporally. This explains why in hearing, the object ceases to 
be a thing—it becomes a sound. 
 (d) Soul as self-reflexing. As already mentioned, a soul is characteristic of animals only. 
Plants do not have a soul. The soul can be defined as the self-reflexive sentience of a 
logically-defined individuality. This logical characteristic of the soul explains why it is not 
composite: it is an expression of the unity of the individual (§ 350, Add.); of “the incomposite 
existence of the unity of selfhood” (§ 344, Add.).  
 The animal in general is self-relating (self-referring)—but not self-reflexive—in the 
sense that it develops in two logical directions that have one crossing point. (In contrast, the 
chemical particles are one-dimensional). On the one hand, it follows the reality and in this 
11 
sense it is part of it. On the other hand, it is only one moving point of reality which is its 
center as an individual.
14,15
 
 (e) Relation to the External World. Animals and men are oriented towards externality in 
the same extent in which they are internally strung in opposition to it (§ 357). This means that 
individuals’ opposing to reality is not absolute. Time and again, they realize that they are not 
self-sufficient. This happens in the relation of individuals’ reproduction through the 
environment, from which they are split off. There are two such relations: of assimilation of 
nutrition, liquids, smoke; of sex. Both processes are cases of consuming (see Milkov 2011). 
The process begins with the awareness of deficiency, and the drive to overcome it (§ 359). 
 (i) Assimilation: 
 The external nature to which the plant—the particular—relates is not individualized, 
but consists of elements which are mass particulars (§ 347). Its relation to the 
external nature is a transformation of one external material to another (§ 345). 
 In contrast, when it interacts with the environment, the animal preserves its selfhood. 
It feels an unpleasant need (hunger) which is nothing but “a connectedness with the 
universal mechanism and abstract powers of the world” (§ 361). The aim is a 
satiation,
16
 by which no deficiency is felt anymore. Now “the organism is objective” 
(§ 366). 
 (ii) Sex-relation: It is characteristic for animals only. In it, the animals are related one to 
another through their senses. This is so since “the genus is present in individual as an urge to 
attain its sentience in the other of its genus” (§ 368). In contrast, the plant is sexless; its sexual 
parts (organs) are not an integral part of its individuality (§ 347). 
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 Helmut Plessner has expressed this point as follows. Organic individuals have a double reference, realized in 
two planes, determined by the boundaries of the individuals:  
(i) They relate themselves to this boundary and so to the environment. This relation is reciprocal.  
(ii) They relate self-referentially to themselves (1928, p. 181; see § 4.1). 
15
 This point suggests a logical explanation of why the personal life is intrinsically paradoxical (see Milkov 
2004). 
16
 “Satiation” is also a term of Frege’s logic which comes to denote the satisfying of a function through its 
argument. It was often translated as “saturation”. For criticism see Milkov (2015). 
12 
 (f) Genus as One Whole. Seen mereologically, one natural kind is one whole. Its different 
exemplars, the individuals, are only its elements. So in a sense, they are one thing; what 
differentiates them one from another are accidental factors: geographical, biographical, etc. 
 This means that the individuals of a genus have souls that are intrinsically identical one 
with another: they are numerically different, but qualitatively identical. To be more exact they 
all are exemplars of the one World Soul (Weltseele).
17
 This explains why biological organism 
is a microcosm (§ 362, Add.).
18
 
 
4. Topological Biology 
4.1. A Reconstruction of Helmuth Plessner’s Scheme 
 Another variant of formal biology was advanced by the German philosopher Helmuth 
Plessner (1892–1982). Plessner was a student of Edmund Husserl, Wilhelm Windelband 
and Max Weber and an admirer of Immanuel Kant and also of Hermann von Helmholz. 
Plessner was the first philosopher who pursued a formal biology in topological form in 
Germany, thus opposing the conception of his teacher Hans Driesch, the father of the neo-
vitalism. In this section, we shall try to put his theory into new terminology. Our motive 
for doing so is that Plessner advanced his theory in 1928 in a German cultural 
environment. As a result, his terminology appears to the readers of today rather obscure. 
This partly explains why his topological biology is rather neglected today.  
 To put it briefly, the main idea of Plessner’s topological biology “was to apprehend life 
in terms of the relation of the individual to its boundary”. (Gerhardt 1998, p. 43) He assumed 
the differentia specifica of biological objects to be the fact that they have “positionality”—we 
shall call it a location—in space. Plessner thus presented biological objects as topological 
entities that are marked off from their environment through their boundary: the membrane 
that encloses the cell, the hide of the animals, the skin of man, etc. The important point is that 
the biological boundary belongs to the body. In contrast, mineral bodies merely have edges; 
the latter do not belong to the objects themselves. 
 Different strata of biological objects have quite different topologies:  
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 For this term used also in Wittgenstein (1979, p. 49e). 
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 “I am my world. (The microcosm.)” Wittgenstein (1922, 5.63) 
13 
 (a)  Plants’ location (positionality) is open. This means that, despite being sharply 
determined by their boundaries, plants directly explore their environment. 
 (b) In contrast, the location (positionality) of animals is closed: they make their location a 
constitutional principle of their being. This means that they are organized around one point—
more precisely, around one figure: the body of the animal that Plessner calls center. 
Accordingly, Plessner calls animals centric biological individuals. Animals live towards, and 
through, their individual form. But they are not this form: they are not individuals. This 
explains why despite the fact that they experience contents of the outer world (they have 
perceptions and experience), they do not experience their personality. 
 (c) Only man has personality. He does not only live out of its location (body); he also 
refers to his location.
19
 That is why Plessner calls him eccentric. The most important 
consequence of this newly explored ontological dimension—developed into a new stratum of 
ontology—is that man experiences his experience. (This makes him self-reflexive, and also 
free.) In this way he trespasses his boundary and exactly in cultivating it, becomes what he 
is.
20
 To be more exact, the man makes himself through his “life-acts”:21 the man constructs 
himself.
22
 He becomes himself only referring to the objects of the external world (Plessner 
1928, p. 17). It is this reflexive making of himself through reference to the external things that 
constitutes his existence. 
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 An alternative topology of man and animal is set out by Karl Marx. According to him, while the animal 
forms its product according to the form and the need of the species to which it pertains, the man produces 
according to any species. The man knows how to lay out the form of any object (1974, p. 158). 
20
 This theory is close to Aristotle’s conception that the “thought thinks on itself because it ... becomes an object 
of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects” (Met., 1072b19–20). Among other things, this 
conception was warmly embraced by Hegel who quoted this passage in a more extended form at the very end of 
his Encyclopedia. This point explains why some authors find Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit a precedent for 
Plessner’s project of formal biology (see Gerhardt 1998, p. 43b).  
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 This conception was initially developed by Wilhelm Dilthey in his book Die Lebensakten der Menschen 
(1907, p. 164). Cf. with the concept of speech-acts, developed around 1910 by Adolf Reinach and after the Sec-
ond World War by J. L. Austin and John Searle. 
22
 This conception strongly reminds John Searle’s theory that social reality is constructed by the way of social 
acts (1995).   
14 
 To put this point in other words, man is incomplete; he needs supplementation (is 
ergänzungsbedürftig) (ibid., p. 18);
23
 and he finds his finite form only in culture. In fact, what 
we call culture is a result of just this characteristic of the human person (ibid., pp. 383 ff.). 
Ultimately, this is neither a result of his will to power (Nietzsche); nor a result of the libido 
(Freud). Rather, culture arises out of the incompleteness of the man from topological point of 
view. 
 (d) It is the existence that makes the common spiritual life of the humanity possible: the 
social life; the mind (Geist) as distinct from the individual consciousness or the personal soul 
(Plessner 1982, p. 15). 
 
4.2. Alternative Biological Topologies 
 The topological approach was often used in philosophy of biology in the past. Already 
Aristotle has noted that “in some animals we find all such distinctions of parts as this of right 
and left clearly present, and in other some; but in plant only above and below” (De caelo, 
284b15–17). 
 In a recent article Berit Brogaard and Barry Smith, following some ideas of Roman 
Ingarden, try to precisely define the beginning of human life (an issue of first-rate importance 
by discussing such issues of applied ethics as abortion) using the same topological approach. 
They fixed the beginning of human life at day 16 after the fertilization of the egg-cell by a 
sperm. Indeed, it is first the embryo, developed in the period of gastrulation, that is 
topologically a self-sufficient entity and which can be seen as an ontological individual. This 
is determined through: (i) its boundary; (ii) it being a unified causal system which is relatively 
isolated from its surroundings (Brogaard and Smith 2000, p. 15). 
 In contrast, the opposing conventional view that the threshold event in the making of a 
human being is to be located towards the end of the first trimester after the fertilizing of the 
egg-cell, refers to such a vague concept as the visible resemblance of the embryo to a human 
being. 
 
4.3. Ecological Topology of Biological Individuals 
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 Another term also used by Gottlob Frege (see n. 15) but in quite different context. To him ergänzungsbedürftig 
are the function and its argument in logic.  
15 
 A case for ontology of environments (Umwelten ) or for ecological topology was first 
developed by the constructivist biology of Jakob von Uexküll. Uexküll claimed that every 
animal creates his own environmental reality. There are as many enclosing realities as there 
are animals; these worlds are, practically, as separated as Leibniz’ monads are. Their 
“environments surround them like solid but invisible glass houses” (Uexküll 1928, p. 62). 
Since all organisms are embedded in their own niches, their forms (shapes) can be 
differentiated according to the forms of the niches: according to their exterior boundary. 
Apparently, Uexküll suggests an alternative—ecological—topology of biological 
individuals. In this section we are going to set out some of its points.
24
 
(i) At one extreme we find the niches that are fully bounded by a retainer. This class can 
be subdivided into:  
 Those whose retainers offer full protection without an access point: an example here is a 
larval cocoon;  
 Those which have access point. Examples are: a closed oyster shell, which must actively 
keep its shell closed to prevent predators from prying it open. The degree of protection 
depends on the physical properties of the retainer. The walls of the crocodile’s egg, for 
example, have a higher protective value that the thin membrane enclosing the mamma-
lian zygote. 
 (ii) Most biological niches, however, are not fully bounded. Examples are: a kangaroo-
pouch, a nest, a hive. All of these are niches which do not involve closed cavities but rather 
natural or artificial hollows within their respective environments. Nevertheless, from the per-
spective of protection it is fairly robust. 
 (iii) There are also niches which are bounded by a partial retainer which offers a low de-
gree of protection. Example is the niche of the oxpecker removing ticks from the back of the 
African rhinoceros’s hide, a niche bounded by a part of the rhinoceros’s hide. 
 (iv) Finally, at the other extreme of the continuum between bound and free niches we 
find biological niches which lack a retainer altogether. Such niches are bubble-like zones in 
some region of space, as in the case of the niche of the fish of the open ocean. This class of 
niche may manifest a range of different topologies. So, for example, when a falcon is flying 
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 In this we follow Smith and Varzi (2001, pp. 235 f.) 
16 
in the sky circling above the area where its prey is to be found, the niche of the falcon is its 
orbit. 
 
Nikolay Milkov 
University of Paderborn 
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